The Virtue of Prudence in Constructing a Just Society

Among the myriad virtues that have shaped philosophical discourse, prudence distinctly emerges

as the cardinal quality guiding rational beings towards morally righteous actions. Deeply rooted

in the teachings of Aquinas and Aristotle, prudence transcends mere caution; it embodies a

symphony of moral discernment, judicious decision-making, and timely execution. This essay

embarks on an in-depth exploration of both Aquinas’s and Aristotle’s treatises, revealing the

multifaceted character of prudence, contrasting its classical essence with contemporary utilitarian

interpretations, and highlighting its pivotal role in nurturing a society grounded in mutual respect

and justice.

Aquinas on the Foundations of Prudence:

According to Aquinas, prudence pertains to both practical and speculative reason. Practical

reason is discernible in its foundational elements that operate within reality. Reality manifests in

relation to topics pertinent to one's life, extending beyond daily scheduling and task

prioritization. As Aquinas elucidates, practical reason is the "right reason" applied to action.

Moreover, practical reason can be cultivated through seeking counsel. Aquinas notes, “a prudent

man is one who is capable of taking good counsel.” (Pt. II-II, Q. 47 Second Article). He further

posits that counsel is tied to an end, akin to scheduling and prioritizing activities. Aquinas's

portrayal of speculative reason is akin to an art form. Daily life defies rigid formulas; through

syllogisms and propositions, while adhering to foundational tenets of validity and truth,

speculative reason allows practical reason to adapt to context without straying from the righteous

path.

Prudence, as a unique virtue, validates this definition through its practical and speculative

applications. Aquinas observes that "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work

good likewise.” (Pt. II-II, Q. 47 Fourth Article). He proceeds to assert that "good" is integral to

the appetitive power. This "good" is functional; thus, the alignment of appetite should navigate

through this prism of prudential reason. For love towards an object to be valid, it must first

adhere to fundamental, including moral, principles. Prudence is distinct because it is the right

reason applied to a harmonized appetite.

Prudence's function in steering moral virtues is instrumental, not terminal. It defines the rationale

behind actions and behaviors. Aquinas states, “the proper end of each moral virtue consists

precisely in conformity with right reason.”(Pt. II-II, Q. 47 Seventh Article). While natural reason

lays down a foundational course, prudence provides virtues like temperance and fortitude with a

framework for expression. Thus, prudence determines the means within this structure to guide

one towards the desired end by actualizing a specific moral virtue.

Integral to prudence are elements such as memory, understanding, and docility. Memory serves

as a repository of personal experiences, informing one's perception of reality. These experiences,

in turn, enable genuine docility to natural reason and foundational principles, such as objective

righteousness. Aquinas contends that “intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered by

experience and time.” (Pt. II-II, Q. 49 First Article). Marrying good counsel with memories of

the past can foster true prudential docility.

In opposition to prudence stands shrewdness. Aquinas describes shrewdness as “a habit whereby

congruities are discovered rapidly.” (Pt. II-II, Q. 49 Fourth Article). For instance, one who

manipulatively employs syllogisms for self-validation or some detrimental end is essentially

gaming the system, thereby misaligning prudence. Shrewdness manifests when one continually

seeks to expose others' perceived hypocrisy. This demeanor represents a variant of false

prudence.

Aquinas's Extension of Prudence:

Turning to societal considerations, prudence manifests in regnative and subjective forms.

Regnative prudence pertains to the wisdom and judgment required by those in leadership roles,

distinct from personal prudence in that it centers on the broader community's welfare. In

contrast, subjective prudence hinges on an individual's ability to make sound decisions based on

their experiences and prevailing circumstances. Aquinas asserts, “prudence is the virtue which is

proper to a prince. Therefore, a special kind of prudence is regnative.” (Pt. II-II, Q. 50 First

Article). While the essence of prudence remains unchanged, its application varies, particularly

concerning leadership and societal governance. In democracies, this regnative form of prudence

parallels executive functions. However, a cautionary note arises when leadership's prudent

decisions become self-serving, termed as false prudence. Such decisions, tainted by self-interest

and potentially influenced by original sin, can be seen within both personal and regnative

contexts.

Domestic prudence isn't inherently negative; its value is determined by its application. If

prudence becomes narrowly focused on materialistic ends, it risks being self-defeating. Aquinas

points out that “prudence is directed to a good life in general, whereas domestic prudence is

aimed at specific objectives, like wealth.” (Pt. II-II, Q. 50 Third Article). Although an individual

within a household can exhibit prudence, misplaced priorities disrupt the intended order,

rendering prudence ineffective.

The Imprudence Quandary:

The nexus between imprudence and sin is intriguing. Often, individuals may lack the

amalgamation of experiences and knowledge to exercise pure prudence. Moreover, certain

experiences or information sources might be misguided. The degree of one's experience and

knowledge can dictate the likelihood of sin's intrusion. Aquinas observes, “imprudence is a sin in

relation to its inherent nature, for it's impossible to act against prudence without breaching its

foundational principles.” (Pt. II-II, Q. 53 First Article). He continues, suggesting that unless

there's a defiance of Divine law or impulsive actions without contempt, such deviations may not

constitute grave sins. Thus, one's journey to genuine prudence can be long and fraught with

potential pitfalls, especially if there's a risk of transgressions.

Both passivity and negligence are counterproductive. While passivity signifies a deliberate lack

of initiative, negligence reflects a breach of the care or attention that a reasonably cautious

individual would exercise under similar conditions. These behaviors can distort prudence,

leading to an inversion of means and ends. Aquinas notes, “a negligent individual struggles with

decision-making, a realm where prudence typically operates. Hence, negligence is intertwined

with imprudence.” (Pt. II-II, Q. 54 Second Article). Such behaviors can pave the way for

transgressions. Given prudence's inherently proactive nature, its incompatibility with passivity

and negligence becomes evident.

The synergy between prudence and justice, as Aquinas postulates, is crucial, particularly

concerning relations beyond oneself. Self-centeredness corrupts genuine prudence, turning it into

a disordered virtue or even a vice. Justice, as defined by Aquinas, concerns interactions with

others, ensuring they receive proper guidance to correct any missteps. It doesn't revolve around

self-interest. Aquinas explains, “justice, unlike other virtues, guides individuals in their

interactions, fostering a sense of equality.” (Pt. II-II, Q. 57 One Article). In today's context,

justice is often misconstrued as self-serving, whereas genuine prudence aligns with Aquinas's

vision of ordered justice. Misguided prudence, on the other hand, can be self-defeating, leading

to what can be termed as false prudence.

Aristotle’s Take on Prudence (from Nicomachean Ethics):

Aristotle often delves into prudence, weaving it through discussions of ethical and intellectual

virtues. He posits, “for deliberating and calculating are synonymous, and one never deliberates

about immutable matters. Therefore, the calculative is a segment of the rational domain.”

(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, Ch. 1) Whether concerning ethical virtues or

intellectual facets like wisdom, a component of calculation always underpins prudence, echoing

Aquinas's perspective. Aristotle expands on this, suggesting that each science can be imparted to

learners through its analytical methods, emphasizing the need to assess situations factually to

achieve pure prudence.

Deliberation, choice, and willpower are central to prudential actions. Deliberation involves

amassing necessary data to guide a prudent decision. In the absence of deliberation, ignorance

prevails. Aristotle explains, “actions emanating from ignorance are universally non-voluntary,

yet they become involuntary only when resulting in regret for the doer.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean

Ethics, Book III, Ch. 1) Such ignorance can lead to misguided outcomes, where the actor must

bear the consequences of their imprudence, especially if it negatively impacts others. Aristotle

further elaborates, “while opinions can be categorized as false or true, choices gravitate more

towards the binaries of bad and good.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, Ch. 2) This

implies that while one's opinion has boundaries, akin to Aquinas's views, ignorance often

culminates in detrimental outcomes.

The role of practical wisdom in prudent actions, according to Aristotle (Book VI), is to ground

prudence in reality, connecting theoretical understanding with actionable knowledge. By aligning

our thought processes with the tangible world and its nuances, practical wisdom ensures that

prudence remains responsive and adaptive, not just an abstract ideal.

Prudence in a Contemporary Context:

Modern interpretations of prudence and justice appear somewhat skewed when juxtaposed with

their classical definitions. These age-old explanations elucidate the inner workings of prudence

and justice, outlining a blueprint for societal harmony and genuine happiness. Present-day

interpretations, driven by self-centric ideals, bear a strong resemblance to utilitarianism. Such an

approach, where individual benefit overshadows collective well-being, aligns with what Aquinas

might label as ignorance.

In contemporary society, prudence often assumes a materialistic and subservient role, tailored to

personal whims. This inversion of means and ends fosters a culture of unchecked individualism.

While some champion this as the epitome of freedom and happiness, it's a flawed perspective,

resonating with the shrewdness that Aquinas warned against. To foster genuine contentment, our

understanding of prudence requires realignment. Acknowledging and reverting to its

foundational principles is the first step towards enacting prudence meaningfully in our lives.

Synthesizing Aquinas and Aristotle for Modern Society:

Building resilient communities hinges on fostering prudential actions at both individual and

collective levels. Both Aquinas and Aristotle underscore the importance of prudence in shaping

an individual's choices, which, when magnified, mold the larger societal framework. By

integrating the insights of these great thinkers, we can prioritize collective well-being over

transient individual gains.

Furthermore, each individual plays a pivotal role in cultivating a society rooted in prudence.

Through self-awareness, education, and practice, individuals can harness prudence's

transformative power, ensuring that personal choices consistently serve the greater good. When

individuals embody prudence, society at large stands to benefit, resulting in a harmonious

coexistence that honors both personal autonomy and collective welfare.

Bibliography:

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins, University

of Chicago Press, 2011.

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica: Part II-II, Volume 3. Translated by the Fathers of the

English Dominican Province, Benziger Brothers, originally published in 1911, 1948.